We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms to minimize the makespan on m unrelated machines. In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [14] showed a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m, thus leaving a large gap. They conjectured that their upper bound is tight, but were unable to prove it. Despite many attempts that yield positive results for several special cases, the conjecture is far from being solved: the lower bound was only recently slightly increased to 2.61 [5, 10] , while the best upper bound remained unchanged.
1. INTRODUCTION
Background
In their STOC'99 paper, Nisan and Ronen [14] introduced the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. In their paper Nisan and Ronen study a problem that takes a central place in the field of algorithmic mechanism design ever since: truthful scheduling on unrelated machines. In this problem, n jobs are to be allocated to m machines, where it takes machine i t j i time units to process job j (and this is also the cost machine i incurs from executing job j). The processing times are private information of the machines. The load of machine i is the sum of processing times of the jobs i is assigned. The designer aims to allocate the jobs to minimize the maximal load over all machines (the "makespan").
Nisan and Ronen design a simple mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of m (the VCG mechanism). They also show that no mechanism, even one with unlimited computational power, can guarantee an approximation ratio better than 2. Nisan and Ronen were unable to close this large gap. However, they conjecture that their upper bound is tight:
Conjecture (Nisan-Ronen): No mechanism for the truthful scheduling problem on unrelated machines can achieve an approximation ratio better than m.
A decade later, although widely believed and extensively studied, this conjecture is far from being solved. In fact, despite many efforts by the community, no additional evidence, to either support the conjecture or to weaken the belief in it, has been provided since. Only recently, Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Vidali [5] were able to slightly improve the lower bound from 2 to 2.41, further improving it to 2.61 later on [10] . Mu'alem and Schapira [13] and Christodoulou et al. [4] prove a lower bound of 2 for randomized and fractional mechanisms, respectively. Dobzinski and Sundararajan [9] and Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Vidali [3] attempted to characterize truthful mechanisms for this problem, but succeeded in doing so only for the very limited case of 2 machines. All these papers involve many non-trivial observations and technicalities, further emphasizing the basic difficulties that this problem entails.
A different line of research attempted to relax the problem, by finding tractable special cases. Archer and Tardos [2] observe that if we consider related machines, then the problem becomes single-parameter 1 . Mechanisms for single-parameter problems are easier to design as only monotonicity has to be ensured, a relatively easy task. Indeed, a truthful PTAS that essentially concludes all efforts in this direction was recently constructed [8] . Back in the multiparameter setting, Lavi and Swamy [12] consider a special case where processing times can take only two possible values, "low" and "high", and give several truthful algorithms that guarantee constant-factor approximation ratios.
Interestingly, all the known lower bounds are just small constants, and there are no super-constant lower bounds. Furthermore, as mentioned before, several truthful mechanisms that provide good approximation ratios for non-trivial special cases have been presented. At this point, the skeptical reader may start doubting the correctness of the NisanRonen conjecture. Perhaps one should interpret the low values of the upper bounds for the special cases and the previous lower bounds as a signal that a truthful mechanism with a good approximation ratio do exist?
Our Result
In this paper we give the first strong, concrete evidence to the correctness of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture.
Theorem:
No anonymous mechanism for the truthful scheduling problem on unrelated machines can achieve an approximation ratio better than m.
An algorithm is anonymous, roughly speaking, if whenever two machines switch costs, the job assignments of the two machines also switch 2 . Note that this is the best lower bound possible as the Nisan-Ronen algorithm is anonymous. Let us explicitly spell out why the class of anonymous mechanisms is of interest:
• Algorithmic Perspective: The classic algorithms for scheduling unrelated machines are indeed anonymous. There does not seem to be an algorithmic reason that explains why a specific naming of the machines can help.
• Mechanism Design Perspective: Indeed, it is very easy to come up with non-anonymous mechanisms. However, are non-anonymous mechanisms more powerful than anonymous ones? All state-of-the-art mechanisms for the special cases in the literature are anonymous [12, 8] . This might suggest that anonymous mechanisms for this problem are as powerful as non-anonymous mechanisms 3 . In fact, a separation between the power of these two classes will be remarkable.
1 A problem is single parameter when, informally, the private information of each player consists of only one number. 2 For the mechanism to "notice" that the machines have switched costs, we of course require that the cost vectors of the machines are unique. See the preliminaries section for a formal definition. 3 There is a single example in a different context ("digital goods") where it is proved that anonymous mechanisms are less powerful [1] . However, this setting is a single-parameter one, comparing to our much complicated multi-parameter setting. Thus, one may doubt whether a complicated derandomization process, similar to the one used in [1] , might be applicable in our multi-parameter setting. Furthermore, we have no evidence that randomized mechanisms for scheduling are significantly more powerful than deterministic ones.
• Game-Theoretic Importance: Not only are anonymous games interesting from a mechanism-design perspective, they are well-studied also from a wider gametheoretic point of view. In particular, anonymous mechanisms are desired from a pure game theoretic point of view as there is no discrimination between the bidders. For further motivation and recent examples of CS papers studying anonymous games see [6, 7] 4 .
To the very least, our result shows that if the Nisan-Ronen conjecture is false and there are mechanisms that provide a reasonable approximation ratio, then they must be very "strange".
Tools and Techniques
Our proof shows that the "difficult" instance is actually the most simple instance from an algorithmic point of view: it is the instance in which all costs are between 1 and 1 + , and the cost vectors are ordered so that one cost vector completely dominates the former one, coordinate-wise. We prove that every truthful anonymous mechanism with a finite approximation ratio to the makespan must allocate all jobs to the machine with the lowest cost vector. This immediately yields a makespan which is m times the optimum. It is the same difficulty that the VCG mechanism encounters, and we show that all anonymous mechanisms suffer from the same drawback.
To show that we have to develop significant amount of new machinery. Specifically, the proof works inductively, starting from the observation that if we have only a single job, then every anonymous mechanism must allocate it to the lowest-cost machine. Unfortunately, this simple fact is not true when more jobs are added (for mechanisms that do not provide a good approximation ratio). The proof proceeds by following a subtle inductive process that requires substantial amount of technical work, which allows us to consider instances with increasing number of jobs. The approximation property is used in few crucially important places throughout the induction.
As the previous proofs do, we bootstrap the basic difficulty that truthfulness casts: given a specific assignment for one instance, truthfulness implies some restrictions on the possible assignments of all other instances that differ from the original instance by exactly one machine. Nisan and Ronen prove their lower bound by simply considering two such neighboring instances (i.e., a single transition from one instance to another). The other lower bounds that were mentioned above consider slightly longer paths of instances, thus improving the lower bound only slightly. The inductive techniques we develop let us tackle much longer paths of instances 5 . This is the key point that enables us to obtain the optimal lower bound. We believe that this is the main novelty of our proof.
Another important technical reason for our success in proving the lower bound is the way we exploit the weak monotonicity property. It is known that every truthful mechanism is also weakly monotone (see the preliminaries for a definition). However, the existing lower bounds prior to our work mainly used a limited and straightforward corollary of weak monotonicity: a machine that declares a vector of costs t and is allocated a bundle S, will be allocated the same bundle S when raising the costs of the jobs not in S and lowering the costs of the jobs in S. We use the weak monotonicity property in more sophisticated ways, by taking into account also the amount of which the costs of the jobs changes, whether allocated to the machine or not. This is another novel technical tool that enables us to prove the optimal lower bound. We believe that this tool will turn out to be even more helpful, as it might be used in solving other intriguing problems in algorithmic mechanism design.
Future Directions
Our proof gives strong evidence that deterministic mechanisms for this central problem do not have much power. Can the anonymity assumption be dropped? Our novel inductive method enables us to reach what seems to be the "correct" difficulty of truthful mechanisms. Thus, we believe that the inductive method and the new technical machinery we introduce might be the basis for further enhancements, to construct lower bounds without the anonymity assumption (though we have not managed to do so yet).
To this end, an interesting observation is that the anonymity property can easily be dropped in the fractional case, since, given any truthful approximation mechanism, one can construct an anonymous mechanism that averages over all permutations of players. This keeps the truthfulness and the approximation properties, and inserts anonymity. It might be possible, thus, to extend our proof to the fractional case, assuming anonymity without loss of generality, and obtain a general lower bound using this route.
PRELIMINARIES

Problem Definition and Notation
Let m be the number of machines, and let N , |N | = n, be the set of jobs. We denote by t j i ≥ 0 the cost for machine i to process job j (this is also the time it takes machine i to process job j). A cost vector for machine i is a vector ti = (t j i ) n j=1 . For every bundle S ⊆ N we denote by ti(S) the total cost for machine i to process the jobs in S. That is, t i (S) = j∈S t j i . Note that an instance of this problem can be viewed as a matrix in which the i th row is the cost vector of machine i, − → ti . We often use matrices to present instances, and use stars ,"*", to indicate jobs assignments; a star next to the entry t 
Truthfulness and Anonymity
A mechanism consists of an allocation function f , and a payment function pi for every machine i. I.e., for every valuation profile t = (t1, . . . , tm), f (t) is the allocation (fi(t) is the bundle assigned to machine i), and p i (t) denotes the payment for machine i when the valuation profile is t. The mechanism is truthful if, for every machine i, declaring its true cost vector is at least as good as declaring any other cost vector. Formally, for every machine i, every ti and every t−i,
where f i (t) denotes the bundle assigned to machine i in the cost vector t = (t1, . . . , tm). We follow the standard notation: t −i denotes the costs of all machines but i. In partic-
The following is a well-known necessary condition for an allocation function to be implementable (i.e., there exist payment functions that make the resulting mechanism truthful): Definition 2.1 (Weak Monotonicity [11] ). An allocation function f is called weakly monotone if for every machine i, and every t i , t i , t −i the following property is sat-
A direct consequence of weak monotonicity, which we often use in our proof, is the following: if a machine is allocated a bundle S (including the empty set) in some given instance, then it will be allocated the same bundle if it lowers the costs for the jobs in S and raises the costs for all other jobs, while all other machines costs are fixed. Formally,
Claim 2.2. Let f be a truthful mechanism for the makespan minimization problem. Let t = (t1, . . . , tm) be some set of valuations, and suppose that machine i is allocated some bundle S in f (t). I.e., f i (t) = S. Let t i be some other cost vector of machine i where t i ({j}) < ti({j}) for all j ∈ S,
This paper deals with anonymous mechanisms. Roughly speaking, one expects a mechanism to be anonymous if for every two machines that switch their costs their assigned bundles switch too. There are some technical issues with this definition; for example, if all machines have the same costs, "switching the costs" makes no sense. To handle this and similar problems we only require the following: if machine k has a unique cost vector (a cost vector is said to be unique if it differs from every other cost vector in at least one coordinate) and is assigned bundle S, then whenever k switches costs with some other machine l, machine l is allocated the bundle S (we stress that no constraints are imposed on what all other machines are assigned after the switch, in particular machine k, nor on instances where there is no machine with a unique cost vector).
We note that this is only one possible definition of anonymity. This definition was chosen only because it is simple to present. Our proof seems to be general enough to hold using essentially any other reasonable definition of anonymity. In particular, the proof uses the anonymity property only in instances where all machines have unique cost vectors. 
Definition 2.3 (An Anonymous Mechanism
f l ( − → t 1, . . . , − → t k−1 , − → t l , − − → t k+1 . . . , − − → t l−1 , − → t k , − − → t l+1 , . . . , − → tm) = f k ( − → t 1 , . . . , − → t m ).
THE LOWER BOUND
In this section we prove our main result: We prove this theorem by induction on the number of jobs, first considering mechanisms for one job, then gradually increasing the number of jobs. Next we formally define the induction hypothesis.
The Induction Hypothesis and the Base Case
We will actually prove a stronger version of the main theorem. The stronger version also serves as our induction hypothesis:
The Induction Hypothesis:
Fix β > 0. Let f be a truthful anonymous mechanism for m machines and n jobs that is guaranteed to provide a c-approximation to the makespan, but only to instances with an optimal makespan of at least β. Consider an instance in which for every job j, t
. . .
Then, f allocates all jobs to machine 1 (the allocation is indicated by stars).
All the instances we consider during the proof will have an optimal makespan larger than some constant β. Since the proof holds for any β > 0, it implies Theorem 3.1. We first prove the induction hypothesis for the base case where there is only one job. In this case the proof is very simple. 
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that the job is allocated to machine i = 1. Now lower machine i's cost to t 1 . By weak monotonicity (see Claim 2.2) machine i keeps the job. In particular, machine 1 is not allocated the job. Now raise machine 1's cost to t i . The job is still not allocated to machine 1, by weak monotonicity. Notice however that machine 1 and i have switched their costs comparing to the instance (1), so by anonymity machine 1 should have received the job. A contradiction.
The Central Argument
We assume the induction hypothesis is true for any n < n. The following Lemma will almost prove the induction hypothesis. . . .
Note that, since c · n · a < minj t j 1 we also have n · a < β. Notice that it is not clear that machine 1 will receive even the jobs k + 1, . . . , n for which its cost is very small, a, although allocating these jobs to machine 1 seems like the "right" thing to do. For example, allocating jobs 1, . . . , k to machine 1 and the rest of the jobs to machines 2, . . . , m might also provide a good approximation. In particular, recall that we cannot assume that these jobs are allocated to machine 1 "without loss of generality": a priori it might be the case that such weird allocations are necessary to construct a truthful mechanism that provides a good approximation ratio.
The proof of the lemma is by induction on k. The case of k = 0 follows immediately since f is a c-approximation. We now fix some 0 < k ≤ n − 1, assume the lemma is correct for every k < k, and prove it for k. Before proving the lemma, we provide an informal overview of the proof.
An Overview of the Proof of Lemma 3.3
The proof of Lemma 3.3 is, yet again, inductive. Below we give an overview of the induction step for an arbitrary k. Step 1: We show that if the mechanism was "restricted" only to the first k jobs, then machine 1 was allocated all of them. Using this we show that even in the unrestricted mechanism machine 1 is still allocated the first k jobs (but not necessarily jobs k + 1, . . . , n). Step 2: Here we verify that machine 1 is allocated all jobs. We do that by reducing the costs of the first k jobs by more than a, and reducing the costs of jobs k + 1, . . . , n from a to a much smaller δ. Weak monotonicity and approximation arguments guarantee that machine 1 is allocated all jobs.
Step 3: This is the most technically involved step. We raise the costs of machines 2 to m one by one, starting from machine m, and show that machine 1 is still allocated all jobs during the process.
Step 1 -Adding Small Jobs
This step shows that by "adding" small jobs that all machines value with the same very low cost does not change the allocation of the first k jobs. The statement of the lemma is almost obvious given the induction hypothesis, but the proof is a bit subtle. 
Lemma 3.4. Let f be a truthful and anonymous mechanism that provides a finite approximation ratio for m machines and n jobs, and suppose an instance t and a constant
Proof. Consider the following allocation function f k on m machines and k jobs, which is defined as follows: given a cost vector − → t i of k jobs for machine i define the cost vector t i : t i ({j}) = t i ({j}) for j ≤ k, and t i ({j}) = a otherwise. Let (S1, . . . , Sm) = f (t 1 , . . . , t m ). Set f k (t1, . . . , tn) = (S1 \ {k + 1, . . . , n}, . . . , S m \ {k + 1, . . . , n}) . In other words, f k "runs" f when the cost of each of the last n − k jobs is a, and allocates its k jobs the same way f allocates its first k jobs.
Proof. Recall the following characterization of truthful mechanisms:
Theorem 3.6 (Saks and Yu [15]). Let f be an allocation function defined on a convex domain of valuations. f is truthfully implementable if and only if it is weakly monotone.
By this theorem (which is applicable since the scheduling domain is convex), all we have to prove is that f k satisfies weak monotonicity. Fix some n-jobs cost vectors t 1 , . . . , t i−1 , t i , . . . , t m of all machines but machine i, where the cost of each machine for jobs k+1, . . . , n is a. Suppose machine i is assigned Si when declaring ti and S i when declaring t i in f (the cost of machine i in t i for jobs k + 1, . . . , n is still a) . The function f is implementable and thus satisfies weak monotonicity. Hence,
Therefore, since machine i did not change its costs of jobs k + 1, . . . , n, we also have that
which implies that f k also satisfies weak monotonicity.
By construction f and f k allocate jobs j = 1, . . . , k identically. Therefore, it is enough to show that f k assigns jobs j = 1, . . . , k to machine 1. Towards this end, observe that f k is anonymous, since the costs of all machines for jobs k + 1, . . . , n is a and f is anonymous. Observe also that f k has a finite approximation ratioc = 2c on all instances of k jobs that has optimal makespan of at least β, by the following argument: let t k be such an instance on k jobs, and let t be an instance on n jobs which is created from t k by adding n − k "a-columns". Let OP T (t) and OP T (t k ) denote the optimal makespans of these two instances. Since OP T (t) ≥ OP T (t k ) ≥ β we know by assumption that the makespan of the allocation f (t) is a c-approximation to OP T (t). We get: the makespan of f k (t k ) is at most the makespan of f (t) which is at most c · OP T (t). Now OP T (t) ≤ OP T (t k ) + n · a and n · a < β < OP T (t k ). Therefore the makespan of f k (t k ) is at most 2c · OP T (t k ), as we need. Hence, by the induction hypothesis machine 1 is allocated jobs 1, . . . , k in f k (t k ) and hence also by f (t).
Step 2 -Lowering the Cost of Machine 1
The massaging process of our instance will be much easier by guaranteing that all jobs, not just jobs 1, . . . , k, are allocated to machine 1. 
Proof. Notice that only machine 1 changed its costs comparing to instance (3) . To see that in the instance (4) machine 1 gets all jobs we use two claims. Both weak monotonicity arguments and the assumption that f provides a finite approximation ratio are used to prove this claim.
Claim 3.8. Machine 1 is allocated at least jobs 1, . . . , k in the instance (4) .
Proof. We have shown that in the instance (3) machine 1 gets some bundle S where S contains all jobs 1, . . . , k, and possibly some more jobs. By our choice of , the cost of every job in S decreased more than the cost of all jobs k + 1, . . . , n together. Thus, by weak monotonicity machine 1 is allocated in the instance (4) some bundle that includes all jobs 1, . . . , k.
Claim 3.9. Machine 1 is allocated all jobs 1, . . . , n in the instance (4) .
Proof. Suppose not. Therefore, by the previous claim, machine 1 is allocated all jobs 1, . . . , k but is not allocated some jobs from k + 1, . . . , n:
Consider the following change in machine 1's costs: the costs of all jobs that it receives in the instance (5) By weak monotonicity the allocation of machine 1 stays the same. Thus, the mechanism does not provide a good approximation ratio: the optimal makespan is less than 2nδ (allocate all jobs to machine 1), while the makespan provided here is at least a > 200ncδ. A contradiction.
Step
-Raising the Costs of Machines 2 to m
In this step we raise machine i's costs of every job j, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n from a to t j i (starting with the instance (4)), and show that machine 1 still receives all jobs. We first need the following two useful claims. Proof. Suppose that machine 1 is allocated bundle T that includes some of the jobs 1, . . . , k (but not all of them). Raise the cost of each job j ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ T to some t j 1 , so that for each such j we still have that 2na < minj(t
Lower the cost of all jobs in T to a, and keep the costs of the other jobs the same. By weak monotonicity machine 1 still does not get the jobs {1, . . . , k} \ T , and machine 1 receives n − k δ jobs for some k ≤ k − 1. However, by induction Lemma 3.3 is already proved for smaller values of k (note that all requirements of the Lemma regarding t and a are satisfied), and this lemma says that if the cost of more than n − k jobs to machine 1 is a, then machine 1 is allocated all jobs 6 . This is a contradiction and the claim follows.
Claim 3.11. In every instance that can be represented as in the matrix (2) that satisfies the conditions detailed in Lemma 3.3, if machine 1 is allocated jobs 1, . . . , k then it is allocated all jobs.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 3.9. Suppose towards a contradiction that machine 1 is not allocated some set T of jobs k + 1, . . . , n (and is allocated the rest of the jobs). Lower the costs of all jobs that machine 1 received to a 2 , and raise the cost of all jobs in T to 2a. Notice that the allocation to machine 1 stays the same, in particular machine 1 does not get the jobs in T . However, the approximation ratio provided is poor: the optimal solution allocates all jobs to machine 1 and has a makespan of less than 2an, while the allocation provided by the mechanism has a makespan of at least minj t j 2 > c · 2an.
We now start to raise the costs of the machines on jobs k + 1...n. We first raise the cost of machine m, then machine m − 1 and so on. The definition of the the family I i aims to capture our state after raising the cost of machine i. . . . Notice that proving that machine 1 is allocated all jobs in instances that belong to I 2 will immediately give us Lemma 3.3 for this value of k.
Proof. The proof of the lemma will make use of the following claim: 
, and such that (1) machine 1 does not get any job in both declarations, and (2) there exists a machine i > 1 such that machine i gets a non-empty set of jobs in both declarations. Now consider the following sequence of instances: (a) Machine 1 declares t j 1 and the rest of the machines declare as in t. By construction we have that machine 1 gets no jobs and machine i gets some jobs. (b) Machine 1 declares t j 1 , machine i declares t j 1 , and the rest of the machines declare as in t. Since in the previous instance machine i got some jobs then by weak monotonicity machine i continues to get some jobs (not necessarily the same set of jobs). However this instance is equivalent to the instance of (8), where machine i is the lowest machine, and therefore by claim 3.15 we get that machine i gets all jobs. In particular machine 1 gets no jobs. (c) Machine 1 declares ti, machine i declares t 1 , and the rest of the machines declare as in t. Since in the previous instance machine 1 did not get any job then by weak monotonicity machine 1 does not get any job here as well. However notice that this last instance (c) is the same as the instance t = (t 1 , t−1) defined above, except that machine 1 and machine i have switched costs. By anonymity since in t machine i gets some jobs then in the last instance (c) machine 1 should get some jobs, however earlier we have argued that it does not get any jobs in instance (c), a contradiction.
As a result of the two last claims we get that in instance (8) machine 1 gets all jobs, which completes the main inductive argument.
